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OPINION OF THE COURT 
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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellant Jose Rodriguez appeals as substantively 
unreasonable the District Court’s discretionary denial of his 
motion for a sentencing reduction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(2).  While this would ordinarily be a routine 
appeal, it is not here because the Government raises a novel 
challenge to our appellate jurisdiction.  The Government 
contends that we lack jurisdiction to consider whether a ruling 
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on a Section 3582(c)(2) motion was substantively 
unreasonable.  We conclude that we have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We will affirm.   
 
I 
 
 In 2012, Rodriguez pled guilty to conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 846, and conspiracy to possess 
firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(o).  The drug quantity was more than 15 and less than 
50 kilograms of cocaine.  Rodriguez was also responsible for 
multiple drug-related robberies.  His sentencing range was 
120-150 months.  The District Court ultimately sentenced 
Rodriguez to 123 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ 
supervised release.   
 
 In 2016, Rodriguez filed a motion for a sentencing 
reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  The basis for the 
motion was Amendment 782 of the Sentencing Guidelines.  
Amendment 782 reduced by two the offense levels in Section 
2D1.1 for drug quantities that trigger a mandatory minimum 
sentence.  U.S.S.G. Supp. App. C, Amend. 782.  Amendment 
782 is retroactive, provided that any reduction take effect on 
or after November 1, 2015.  U.S.S.G. Supp. App. C, Amend. 
788; U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, cmt. n.6.1   
                                              
 1  All references to Section 1B1.10 refer to the 2015 
edition of the Guidelines Manual, which was effective 
November 1, 2015.  See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, cmt. n.8 
(providing that “the court shall use the version of this policy 
statement that is in effect on the date on which the court 
reduces the defendant’s term of imprisonment as provided by 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)”). 
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 The District Court found Rodriguez eligible for an 
Amendment 782 sentencing reduction, but denied relief in the 
exercise of its discretion.  The District Court found that 
Rodriguez had engaged in “an unyielding and escalating 
pattern of drug-related and violent behavior which has been 
undeterred by prior and substantial terms of imprisonment.”  
App. 12.  Rodriguez now appeals.  He asserts that his 
unmodified sentence is substantively unreasonable, based 
upon the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and his post-
sentencing conduct.   
 
II 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  United States v. Styer, 573 F.3d 151, 153 n.2 (3d Cir. 
2009).  We have jurisdiction to address our own jurisdiction.  
United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 
291 (1947).  We hold that we have jurisdiction over the 
merits of this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, as explained 
below.  Styer, 573 F.3d at 153 n.2.2  We review the District 
Court’s decision to deny Rodriguez’s sentencing reduction 
motion for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Thompson, 
825 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). 
 
 
 
III 
                                                                                                     
 
 2  Because we conclude that we have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291, we need not determine whether we also 
have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
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 This case involves a motion for a sentencing reduction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  Section 3582(c)(2) is an 
“exception to the general rule of finality” over sentencing 
judgments, set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b).  Dillon v. United 
States, 560 U.S. 817, 824 (2010).  Section 3582(c)(2) applies 
to amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines.  It provides that 
a district court may reduce a sentence if two conditions are 
met: (1) the defendant was sentenced “based on a sentencing 
range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing 
Commission” and (2) “a reduction is consistent with 
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission.”  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); see also United States 
v. Flemming, 617 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 
 The “policy statement[]” referenced in Section 
3582(c)(2) is Section 1B1.10 of the Sentencing Guidelines.  
See Dillon, 560 U.S. at 827.  Section 1B1.10, in turn, contains 
its own, more specific requirements for a sentencing 
reduction.  Under Section 1B1.10, the amendment to the 
Sentencing Guidelines must be retroactive.  U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B.1.10(a)(2)(A), (d).  It must also “have the effect of 
lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range,” based 
upon a prescribed method of calculation.  U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B.1.10(a)(2)(B). 
 
  If these eligibility requirements are met, a district 
court has the discretion to grant a sentencing reduction “after 
considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the 
extent that they are applicable.”  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); see 
also Flemming, 617 F.3d at 257.  In addition, a district court 
“shall consider the nature and seriousness of the danger to 
any person or the community” and “may consider post-
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sentencing conduct of the defendant.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, 
cmt. n.1(B)(ii-iii); see also Flemming, 617 F.3d at 257.   
 
IV 
 
 Rodriguez is indisputably eligible for a Section 
3582(c)(2) sentencing reduction under Amendment 782.  The 
District Court, however, denied relief in the exercise of its 
discretion.  The Government contends that we lack appellate 
jurisdiction over Rodriguez’s claim that his unmodified 
sentence is substantively unreasonable.  We disagree.  For the 
reasons below, we have jurisdiction over the District Court’s 
final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
A 
 
 This Court routinely exercises jurisdiction over 
appeals just like this one.  Although the vast majority of these 
decisions are unpublished, we have held in an analogous, 
published case, Styer, that “[w]e have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.”  573 F.3d at 153 n.2.  In Styer, we not 
only asserted jurisdiction, but also reached the merits of the 
defendant’s claim that his unmodified sentence was 
substantively unreasonable in light of the Section 3553(a) 
factors.  Id. at 154-55.  This ruling on the merits implies that 
we were satisfied as to our jurisdiction.  See Trent Realty 
Assocs. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Phila., 657 F.2d 
29, 36 (3d Cir. 1981).   
 
 Styer notwithstanding, the Government argues that 
there is no binding precedent establishing our appellate 
jurisdiction because our prior treatment was cursory.  
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Assuming arguendo that Styer is not binding, we will explain 
why we have jurisdiction under Section 1291.3 
 
 At the outset, we note that three other Circuits have 
also concluded after a full analysis that jurisdiction lies under 
Section 1291.  Jones, 846 F.3d at 370; United States v. 
Washington, 759 F.3d 1175, 1180-81 (10th Cir. 2014); United 
States v. Dunn, 728 F.3d 1151, 1156-58 (9th Cir. 2013).  At 
least two more Circuits have, in recent decisions, asserted 
jurisdiction under Section 1291, without explanation.  United 
States v. Hernandez-Marfil, 825 F.3d 410, 411 (8th Cir. 2016) 
(per curiam); United States v. Purnell, 701 F.3d 1186, 1188 
(7th Cir. 2012) (jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
18 U.S.C. § 3742).  The only Circuit to reach a contrary 
holding is the Sixth Circuit, which held sua sponte that it 
lacks jurisdiction to review for substantive reasonableness a 
ruling on a Section 3582(c) motion.  United States v. Bowers, 
                                              
 3  At oral argument, the Government described the 
origins of its novel challenge to our jurisdiction.  The 
Government’s argument was prompted by proceedings in an 
analogous case, United States v. Jones, 846 F.3d 366 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017).  In Jones, the District of Columbia Circuit sua 
sponte ordered supplemental briefing on jurisdiction.  The 
Government filed a supplemental brief in Jones.  It then filed 
an almost verbatim copy of the Jones brief as its principal 
brief in Rodriguez’s case.  See Consolidated Suppl. Br. for 
Appellee, United States v. Jones, 846 F.3d 366 (D.C. Cir. 
2017) (Nos. 15-3063, 15-3064), 2016 WL 6092381.  Jones 
has since been decided, against the Government.  Jones, 846 
F.3d at 370 (exercising jurisdiction under Section 1291). 
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615 F.3d 715, 717 (6th Cir. 2010).  No Circuit has followed 
this 2010 decision.4 
 
B 
 
 We turn now to the substance of our jurisdictional 
ruling, beginning with the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Section 
1291 provides that the courts of appeals have “jurisdiction of 
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.”  
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “Final judgment in a criminal case means 
sentence.  The sentence is the judgment.”  Berman v. United 
States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937).  As we have stated, “[a] 
judgment of sentence is a final order . . . .  This court not only 
has the [p]ower to review an appeal after sentence of 
conviction, we have the [d]uty to review it as a final order, 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.”  United States v. Moskow, 588 F.2d 882 
(3d Cir. 1978).  Accordingly this Court regularly exercises 
jurisdiction over sentencing appeals under Section 1291 (in 
addition to 18 U.S.C. § 3742).  See, e.g., United States v. 
Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 564 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc); 
United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Charles, 467 F.3d 828, 830 n.4 (3d Cir. 
2006); United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 327 n.4 (3d 
Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Rita v. United 
States, 551 U.S. 338, 346-47 (2007). 
                                              
 4  Bowers conflicts with the settled law of our Court.  
Specifically, Bowers begins with the premise that 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 is not a source of jurisdiction for sentencing appeals.  
Bowers, 615 F.3d at 719 (citation omitted).  In contrast, our 
Court regularly hears sentencing appeals under both 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  See infra Section 
IV.B. 
9 
 
 
 Our many decisions exercising Section 1291 
jurisdiction over sentencing appeals are analogous to the 
instant case, which is an appeal of a ruling on a Section 
3582(c)(2) motion.  Like sentencing judgments, rulings on 
Section 3582(c)(2) motions are “unquestionably ‘final 
decisions of [a] district[] court’ because they close the 
criminal cases once again.”  Jones, 846 F.3d at 369 (alteration 
in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1291).  Thus, the judgment 
of the District Court denying Rodriguez’s sentencing 
reduction motion was a final order under Section 1291. 
 
C 
 
 This, however, does not fully resolve our inquiry as to 
whether we have Section 1291 jurisdiction over Rodriguez’s 
appeal.  This is because another, narrower jurisdictional 
statute—18 U.S.C. § 3742—could potentially interfere with 
our Section 1291 jurisdiction.  For the reasons below, we hold 
that it does not.  
 
1 
 
 Section 3742(a) provides that a defendant may appeal 
“an otherwise final sentence” under enumerated 
circumstances; i.e. if the sentence: 
 
(1) was imposed in violation of 
law; 
 
(2) was imposed as a result of an 
incorrect application of the 
sentencing guidelines; or 
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(3) is greater than the sentence 
specified in the applicable 
guideline range to the extent that 
the sentence includes a greater 
fine or term of imprisonment, 
probation, or supervised release 
than the maximum established in 
the guideline range, or includes a 
more limiting condition of 
probation or supervised release 
under section 3563(b)(6) or 
(b)(11) than the maximum 
established in the guideline range; 
or 
 
(4) was imposed for an offense for 
which there is no sentencing 
guideline and is plainly 
unreasonable. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
 
 Our Section 1291 jurisdiction may be limited in some 
cases by Section 3742.  As a general principle, an appellant 
cannot resort to Section 1291’s “broad grant of jurisdiction to 
circumvent statutory restrictions on sentencing appeals in 
§ 3742.”  Jones, 846 F.3d at 369.  More specifically, “the 
presence of Section 3742 might pose an obstacle” to review 
under Section 1291 if Section 3742’s “provisions barred 
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review for reasonableness” and the statute were otherwise 
applicable.  Id. (citation omitted).5 
 
 Section 3742 is not an “obstacle” to our Section 1291 
jurisdiction because it does not bar review for reasonableness.  
To the contrary, Section 3742(a)(1) allows review for 
reasonableness because “an unreasonable sentence is 
‘imposed in violation of law’ under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1).”  
Cooper, 437 F.3d at 327 (applying United States v. Booker, 
543 U.S. 220 (2005)); see also United States v. Jackson, 467 
F.3d 834, 838 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that post-Booker “we 
have jurisdiction to review all criminal sentences for 
reasonableness”).  The fact that Section 3742 permits 
reasonableness review “completely moots the theory that use 
of § 1291 would undercut § 3742’s limitations.”  Jones, 846 
F.3d at 369.6  
                                              
 5  As set forth below, Section 3742 does not bar review 
for reasonableness.  This is sufficient to establish that Section 
3742 is not a barrier to our jurisdiction under Section 1291.  
As such, we need not reach the question whether Section 
3742 is otherwise applicable to a Section 3582(c)(2) 
sentencing reduction motion. 
 
 6  The Tenth Circuit also considered the potential 
interaction between Section 1291 and Section 3742, but 
framed the question slightly differently.  United States v. 
Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1321 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc).  Hahn 
asked whether Section 3742 “impliedly repeal[ed],” in 
relevant part, Section 1291.  Id. (quoting Branch v. Smith, 538 
U.S. 254, 273 (2003) (plurality)).  It concluded that it did not.  
Id. at 1322.  Although, like Jones, we do not employ the 
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2 
 
 The Government attempts to refute our jurisdictional 
holding by drawing upon this Court’s precedent regarding 
downward departures.  A departure is a sentence outside the 
Guideline range “given for reasons contemplated by the 
Guidelines themselves (under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 and Ch. 5, 
Pt. K).”  Jackson, 467 F.3d at 837 n.2.7  As the Government 
emphasizes, we lack jurisdiction to review a district court’s 
discretionary denial of a downward departure.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 627 (2002); Jackson, 467 
F.3d at 839; Cooper, 437 F.3d at 333; United States v. 
Denardi, 892 F.2d 269, 272 (3d Cir. 1989).   
 
 Our downward departure cases are distinguishable.  As 
we held in Cooper, this distinction turns upon Congress’s 
intent in enacting Section 3742.  As to a downward departure, 
Sections “3742(a) and (b) reflect Congress’s intent to 
foreclose review of a sentencing court’s decision not to 
depart” under the relevant Guidelines.  Cooper, 437 F.3d at 
333 (citations omitted).  But as to a substantively 
unreasonable sentence, Section 3742 does not evince 
Congress’s intent to foreclose review.  This is because “in 
enacting §§ 3742(a)(1) and (b)(1), Congress could not have 
contemplated that the sentencing scheme it adopted would 
later be declared advisory” in Booker.  Id. at 328.    
                                                                                                     
implied repeal doctrine here, our holding is consistent with 
Hahn. 
 
 7  A “departure” is different from a “variance,” which 
is a sentence outside the Guidelines range under Booker.  
Jackson, 467 F.3d at 837 n.2. 
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 To synthesize these two points, “§ 3742 works in 
tandem with § 1291 [potentially] limiting judicial review of 
only those sentencing decisions that are part of Congress’s 
sentencing Guidelines scheme but leaving intact the general 
grant of jurisdiction over sentencing appeals under § 1291.”  
Briana Lynn Rosenbaum, Righting the Historical Record: A 
Case for Appellate Jurisdiction over Sentences for 
Reasonableness under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 62 Hastings L.J. 
865, 918 (2011).  Thus, we have jurisdiction over 
Rodriguez’s appeal under Section 1291, notwithstanding 
Section 3742. 
 
V 
 
 We now reach the merits of Rodriguez’s appeal.  We 
conclude that the District Court did not impose a 
substantively unreasonable sentence based upon the 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the threat to public safety and 
Rodriguez’s post-sentencing conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, 
cmt. n.1(B)(ii-iii).  Rodriguez participated in a vast drug 
trafficking conspiracy and a series of violent, armed 
robberies, including a robbery of a drug dealer’s family.  He 
has an extensive criminal history.  Rodriguez committed the 
underlying crimes soon after his release from a lengthy prison 
sentence for drug and firearm offenses.  Although Rodriguez 
has had no misconduct in prison, the District Court 
considered this fact and concluded that it does not outweigh 
the public safety risk.  The District Court also considered the 
fact that Rodriguez accepted responsibility, and concluded 
that he has been appropriately rewarded.  “This weighing and 
consideration of multiple factors, expressly left to a court’s 
discretion, is exactly the type of ‘reasoned appraisal’ to which 
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we defer on review.”  Styer, 573 F.3d at 155 (quoting 
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 111 (2007)). 
 
VI 
 
 The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 
